Prices and Coupons for Breakfast Cereals by Aviv Nevo & Catherine Wolfram
1
1. INTRODUCTION
Economists have devoted substantial theoretical and empirical work to analyzing
advertising decisions, while another predominant form of short-run non-price
competition, promotions, has received almost no attention.  According to a 1993 survey,
the typical non-durable goods’ manufacturer spent more money on promotions than on
advertising.
1  The costs of couponing are by far the largest component of promotion
budgets.
2  In 1996, consumer packaged goods manufacturers distributed 268.5 billion
coupons, of which 5.3 billion (2 percent) were redeemed.  The average face value for
coupons issued in 1996 was 67 cents, so consumers redeemed coupons worth
approximately $3.5 billion.
3
This paper considers coupons for ready-to-eat (RTE) breakfast cereals, one of the
most heavily couponed products.
4  The time spanned by our study includes a rapid
escalation in couponing, and preceded attempts by some of the manufacturers to stop
issuing coupons.  We assess whether the relationship between coupons and shelf prices is
consistent with the widely expressed view that coupons are primarily a tool to allow price
discrimination.  Finding that they are not, we exploit the richness of our data to document
couponing patterns across brands and cities and over time.  By supplying as many "stylized
facts" as possible, we seek to provide insight on the empirical relevance of additional
theories for why manufacturers use coupons.
                                                       
1 Donnelly Marketing Inc. 16
th Annual Survey of Promotional Practices reports that trade
promotions accounted for 46.9 percent of the typical promotion budget, consumer promotions
27.9 percent and media advertising 25.2 percent.  We will focus on consumer promotions, which
are still larger than advertising.
2 Manufacturers circulate coupons in newspapers, magazines or direct mailings.  If a customer
clips a coupon, brings it to a store and buys the designated product, he or she is entitled to a
discount. Other forms of promotions include in-store displays or samples.
3 These statistics were collected by NCH Promotional Services and reported in several
publications, including Marketing News, March 31, 1997, p. 26.
4 For example, in 1993 there were more coupons redeemed for breakfast cereals than any other
group of consumer goods except “health and beauty aids” (see Brandweek, March 21, 1994,
p.44).2
We draw on a three-dimensional panel data set with information on shelf prices and
available coupons for 25 RTE breakfast cereal products in up to 65 cities for every quarter
from the beginning of 1989 until the end of 1992.  We observe quarters during which
there was no coupon for a particular brand in some cities and others in which a coupon
was recently distributed and compare shelf prices under the two scenarios.  The static
monopoly price discrimination theory predicts a (weakly) positive correlation under a
broad set of assumptions.  Since coupon and price decisions are made simultaneously, it
is necessary to control for common shocks to demand or costs that may affect both
decisions.  We do so by exploiting the panel nature of the data set.
We find that shelf prices are generally lower when there is a coupon available, and
this result holds as we add a number of fixed effects to control for unobserved changes in
demand and costs.  Next we evaluate the patterns of coupons across brands, cities and time,
to gather some suggestive evidence on a number of possible explanations for the negative
relationship between coupons and shelf prices.  We find some support for models of price
discrimination in oligopoly settings that suggest inter-brand competition can cause all
prices to be lower than the uniform (non-discriminatory) price (Corts, 1998).  We also
find some evidence suggesting that coupons are used most intensively at the end of
manufacturers’ fiscal years (and these differ across manufacturer).  This suggests brand
managers have incentives to use coupons and price cuts simultaneously in order, for
example, to meet market share targets.
We find less support for theories that suggest the vertical relationship between
manufacturers and retailers affects the correlation between shelf prices and coupons, and
evidence that is inconsistent with dynamic descriptions of demand that predict that lower
prices could accompany coupons.
Existing work on couponing was spawned by several disciplines, including
economics and marketing.  Some researchers, primarily economists, have chosen to explore
the potential price discriminatory effects of coupons.  The empirical work has uncovered
patterns consistent with the price discrimination interpretation of coupons, showing for3
instance that coupon users have more elastic demand than non-users (see Narasimhan,
1984).  No papers (of which we are aware) look directly at the relationship between shelf
prices and coupons.
5  Other researchers have addressed the promotional dimensions of
couponing, and emphasize, for instance, the effects coupons have on the likelihood that a
consumer will try a new product, or how coupons might shift the point in time when a
consumer decides to purchase a product.
This paper also adds to the literature on the RTE breakfast cereal industry.  The
industry has attracted the attention of both academic economists and the antitrust
authorities since it is a highly concentrated, stable oligopoly.  Several dimensions of the
industry have been analyzed, including product positioning (Schmalensee, 1978, and
Scherer, 1979) and pricing (Nevo, 1998).  Our paper provides a unique analysis of
manufacturers’ short-run, non-price strategies.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section, we review past work
on coupons, organizing the summary into theories that predict that coupons and prices will
be positively correlated and those that predict coupons and prices will be negatively
correlated.  In the third section we describe our data.  Section four presents our empirical
results and section five concludes.
2. POTENTIAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN COUPONS AND SHELF PRICES
In this section, we summarize a number of theories of couponing, focusing on
their implications for the relationship between coupons and shelf prices.  We first
describe explanations that predict coupons and prices will be positively correlated
                                                       
5 Of all the existing studies of which we are aware, Levedahl (1986) probably comes closest to
ours.  He uses individual transaction-level data to show that prices for paper towels are higher for
transactions that involve coupons, controlling for brand and geographic area effects.  He does not
control for time effects over his 18-month sample, and couponing rates for most products have
increased over time (as have prices), nor does he control for aspects of the individual transactions,
such as the store at which the purchase was made.  Also, his price variable does not reflect in-
store discounts (e.g. store coupons).4
(implying that prices will go up when coupons are available) and next focus on
explanations that predict that coupons and prices will be negatively correlated.  We also
briefly outline the testable implications of each theory.
Prices will Go Up When Coupons are Available
1.  Static Monopoly Price Discrimination
Couponing is a canonical example of price discrimination.
6  A monopolist may
profitably charge discriminatory prices if he can identify consumers with different
elasticities and prevent the consumers who receive the lower price from reselling.  If only
more price-sensitive customers bother to clip, save and use coupons, they allow the
manufacturers to separate customers into groups with distinct price elasticities.  High
transaction costs prevent resale.
Under some very general conditions on demand, the theoretical effect of third-
degree price discrimination on prices is unambiguous in the case of a monopolist.  If a
monopolist can separate its customers into two groups, it will charge the group with less
elastic demand a higher price than the group with the more elastic demand.  The less
elastic group’s price will also be (weakly) higher than the uniform price (see Varian,
1989 for an overview).
7
A number of empirical studies have found indirect evidence suggesting that
coupons allow sellers to price discriminate. Studies have demonstrated (1) that coupon
users have higher price elasticities of demand (Narasimhan, 1984), (2) that low-priced
generic products have lower market shares if the brand-name manufacturers coupon
heavily (Sethuraman and Mittelstaedt, 1992), and (3) that a larger percent of consumers
                                                       
6 For example, both Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1995, p. 372) and Carlton and Perloff (1994,
pp. 432-433) discuss coupons as examples of price discrimination.
7 Varian (1985) and Schmalensee (1981) consider the welfare effects of third-degree price
discrimination.5
use coupons for brands with higher shelf prices (Vilcassim and Wittink, 1987).  All these
studies address the question of whether manufacturers could use coupons to price
discriminate.  We, on the other hand, are interested in describing manufacturers’ main
motivations in issuing coupons.
Our approach circumvents some of the challenges faced by most empirical
attempts to identify instances of price discrimination.  For instance, different groups of
consumers may be charged different prices if costs vary by group.  For instance, we find
that coupons are more frequently disseminated in large cities and that shelf prices are also
higher in the large cities.  Simply looking at cross-city differences, therefore, would
suggest shelf prices and coupon availability are positively correlated.  It is plausible,
however, that delivery or retailer costs are higher in large cities while the cost of
distributing coupons is lower (for instance, if there is a fixed cost that gets spread over
more people).  Within cities, the cost of supplying a box of cereal to coupon users and
non-users is clearly identical.  (If anything, the supplier incurs additional costs to
circulate and process the coupons.)  Existing empirical studies of price discrimination
with coupons have generally relied on broad cross-sectional comparisons and have done
little to account for other possible explanations of observed patterns.
8
2.  Correlation between Coupons and Advertising Campaigns
Absent cost differences, a positive correlation between coupons and shelf prices
does not prove they are being used to price discriminate.  Prices and coupons might be
positively correlated if coupons are associated with factors that shift demand for a
product at all prices.  Many marketing articles consider the demand effects of coupons by
assessing the types of customers that use coupons and how they affect consumers’
purchase decisions.
9  Though the literature tends not to speak directly to the relationship
                                                       
8 For instance, Gerstner, Hess and Holthauser (1994) compare the number of coupons issued by
broad product category and relate it to retailers average margins by product category.
9 The marketing literature on coupons is extremely broad, and we by no means purport to provide
a comprehensive summary of it.  For one thing, we deliberately focus on studies that have some
implications for the relationship between shelf prices and coupons.6
between coupons and shelf prices, the results suggest that if coupons shift demand out
prices and coupons may be positively correlated.  Increases in demand will lead to higher
prices if the suppliers face upward sloping cost functions or if demand becomes less
elastic and suppliers raise markups.
Marketing articles have used a variety of techniques to assess whether coupons
expand demand for a product (that is, generate incremental sales). For example, Neslin
(1990) examines coupons for seven instant coffee brands over a one-year period in one
(unnamed) city.  He finds a positive correlation between coupon availability and a
brand’s market share and concludes that on average 44 percent of coupon users would not
have purchased the brand in absence of a coupon.  Chiang (1995), however, explicitly
models individual consumers’ decisions to use a coupon (to account for selection) and
finds that coupons do not expand demand for a particular category of product, though he
does not consider intra-category, inter-brand effects.
Other research has focused on whether characteristics of the coupon itself affect
whether the coupon lures new or infrequent users (i.e., expands demand).  Neslin and
Clarke (1987) experimentally distributed coupons and then surveyed recipients on the
frequency with which they purchased the product in the past and whether or not they used
the coupon to purchase the good after they received it.  They find, for instance, that when
the survey respondents had to voluntarily request coupon booklets, they were more likely
to use the coupons to try new brands.  Similarly, Lee and Brown (1985) show that a
particular type of coupon increased demand for non-coupon users while others only
affected users’ demand (see also, Srinivasan, Leone and Mulhern, 1995).  Other studies
have assessed whether characteristics of the advertisements accompanying a coupon in
the free-standing inserts (FSIs) change redemption patterns (LeClerc and Little, 1997).
If coupons are used to price discriminate, one still might observe coupons
generating incremental sales since price discrimination allows the supplier to price below
the valuation of a larger number of customers.  Other explanations suggest that coupons
could shift demand by either alerting customers to the existence of a new good or7
reminding them of the attributes of an old one.  Without surveying customers about their
motivation for using a particular coupon, it is very difficult to distinguish between the
two effects.  (One could imagine trying to take advantage of the fact that the price
discrimination theory suggests a relationship between shelf prices and the face value of
the coupon while shifts in demand are likely to be independent of face value, though it
still may be difficult to disentangle the effects.)  For our purposes, we simply want to
note that coupons may shift demand, so even if manufacturers don’t use them to price
discriminate, shelf prices may go up when coupons are available.
Prices will Go Down When Coupons are Available
1. Price Discrimination with Strategic Interaction Effects
 
  Recent work has extended the theory of price discrimination to oligopolistic
industries (see Katz, 1984; Borenstein, 1985; Holmes 1989; and Corts, 1998).  Holmes
(1989) shows that, under certain symmetry assumptions, the unambiguous prediction that
discrimination will lead to higher profits extends to an oligopoly setting.  Corts (1998),
however, points out that Holmes’ symmetry assumptions are not innocuous.  He derives
conditions under which price discrimination may lead to lower profits, and, more
importantly for our purposes, to lower prices for all consumers.
 
 Corts’ logic is best demonstrated through a simple example.
10  Suppose there are
two types of cereal buyers, students and professors, and two types of cereal, Kellogg’s
Raisin Bran and General Mills Cheerios.  At equal prices students prefer Cheerios, while
professors happen to think Raisin Bran tastes better and are less price sensitive than
students.  Assume that both cereals are manufactured at zero marginal cost.  Also suppose
that students cut coupons and professors do not.  Without coupons (i.e. if the sellers are
constrained to charge uniform prices), there is a plausible set of assumptions under which
the Cheerios price would be lower than the optimal price to students and higher than the
                                                       
10 This example is similar to the one presented by Corts in his section two.8
optimal price to professors, and the uniform Raisin Bran price would be higher than a
student-only price and lower than a professor-only price.
 
 Ignoring strategic responses to the other firm’s prices for a minute, it is clear that
Cheerios has no incentive to offer coupons, but Raisin Bran can profitably use coupons to
try to set a lower price for students.  If Raisin Bran issues a coupon, which given our
assumptions is used solely by students, Cheerios will want to lower its price to students,
which will result in a lower shelf price, and potentially a coupon, for Cheerios.  If the
Cheerios shelf price is lowered enough this will generate competition for Raisin Bran in
the professors markets; thus, in turn generating a response from Raisin Bran.  In the end,
both Raisin Bran and Cheerios shelf prices may be lower with coupons.
 
 There are several assumptions that this example embodies, but only one that is
central to Corts’ result.  Prices will only fall for all consumers if the coupon users and
non-users have different brand preferences.  (In the example, professors preferred Raisin
Bran and students preferred Cheerios.)  Corts labels this condition “best-response
asymmetry.”  The plausibility of this assumption to the RTE cereal market is unclear.
 
  Empirically, we can assess the influence of strategic interaction effects by
considering whether the relationship between a given brand’s price and the coupons for
that brand are influenced by the presence of coupons for competing brands.
 
2. Dynamic Demand Effects
Prices and coupons may be negatively correlated if the manufacturers’ decision to
issue a coupon is correlated with factors that change demand in a market.  For instance,
Sobel (1984) develops a model in which suppliers periodically discount goods to clear
the market of low valuation consumers.  The model he develops assumes two types of
consumers – high valuation and low valuation.  Sobel also assumes that consumers arrive
in the market over time and that low valuation consumers are willing to postpone their
purchases.  He demonstrates that sellers will periodically find it optimal to lower prices to9
clear out low valuation consumers.  An extension of his model might suggest that sellers
periodically use coupons to clear out low valuation consumers and leave shelf prices
unchanged at the high consumers’ valuation.
11  (Sellers may only use coupons
periodically if there are costs to distributing and processing them.)  If only low valuation
consumers are willing to use coupons and there are only two types of consumers, this
would predict zero correlation between shelf prices and coupons.  A slight augmentation
of Sobel’s model might suggest that sellers periodically use both coupons and price
reductions to clear out low and very low valuation consumers.  (Note, however, that for
some distributions of consumer types, periodic coupons could permit higher shelf prices.)
These models predict that coupons are issued in response to intertemporal patterns
in demand – in this case the accumulation of low valuation consumers.  Such changes in
demand are difficult to measure empirically, though we attempt to corroborate these
stories in several ways.  For one, these stories predict distinct patterns in the relationship
between the volume of cereal sold and coupons.  Coupons would tend to be associated
with high volume and may follow periods of low volume sales.  Coupons are also
unlikely to be issued in back-to-back periods.
There are also suggestions in the marketing literature that coupons affect the point
at which people make a decision to buy a product.  For instance, a consumer who sees a
coupon in the Sunday paper may put the product on her shopping list and then be
convinced to buy the product when she sees the product on sale at the store.  Sellers may
be willing to temporarily lower prices to lure new buyers if the new buyers, having tried
the product, are willing to purchase the product in the future at the full price.  (Levedahl,
1986 presents a model of coupons with dynamic effects on demand.)  While these ideas
often are difficult to reconcile with economists’ notions of well-defined preferences, they
suggest a negative correlation between prices and coupons.
 
                                                       
11 Various marketing studies lend some support to the hypothesis that coupons are used to target
consumers that are willing to substitute demand intertemporally.  Nesline, Henderson and Quelch
(1985) find that coupons encourage people to accelerate their purchases and Eppen and
Lieberman (1984) find that discounts encourage consumers to stockpile goods.10
3. Retailers’ Objective Functions
To this point, we have abstracted from the fact that most goods for which coupons
are issued are sold to the final consumers by a retailer and not by the manufacturer.  (This
is clearly the case for breakfast cereals).  While the manufacturers issue coupons and set
wholesale prices, retailers set the shelf prices.  If coupons are simply price discriminatory
mechanisms, it is relatively straightforward to show that the shelf price will increase (in
the absence of the strategic effects discussed above).  Even if the retail sector is perfectly
competitive, manufacturers will increase the wholesale price.  If retailers have some
market power, they will increase the price further.  Since all supermarkets provide
baskets of goods, however, it is possible that the supermarkets take advantage of the
advertising effects of coupons.  If the coupons inspire customers to put a good on their
shopping lists, supermarkets may then discount the couponed good (and advertise the
discount) to lure people into their store, anticipating that they will also purchase high
margin products.  This effect might occur for cereal in particular since it is a staple good
that a large fraction of consumers are likely to buy on a trip to a grocery store.
Empirically we examine this hypothesis by correlating the patterns of coupons with
structure of the retail sector in different cities.
4. Retailer or Manufacturer Costs
 
It is possible that the manufacturers and/or the retailers face declining average
costs over some range.  For instance, there could be economies of scale at the
manufacturing level, or managing fluctuating inventory levels may be costly to either the
retailer or manufacturer.  In periods when demand is low (for instance, due to seasonal
effects), manufacturers may simultaneously issue coupons and reduce prices.  Also,
within the cereal-manufacturing firms, the people making decisions about pricing and
coupons may face incentives to sustain or increase market share or volume sales.  For
instance, brand managers may have market share goals they are trying to meet within a
certain time frame.  The cheapest way for the brand managers to increase sales might





We explore the empirical relationship between coupons and shelf prices using
data from two main sources.  The cereal price data were obtained from the IRI Infoscan
Data Base at the University of Connecticut.
13  These data were collected by Information
Resources, Inc. (IRI), a marketing firm in Chicago, using scanning devices in a national
random sample of supermarkets in metropolitan areas and rural towns.  Weekly data for
UPC-coded products are drawn from a sample, which represents the universe of
supermarkets with annual sales of more than $2 million dollars, accounting for 82% of
grocery sales in the US.  In most cities the sample covers more than 20% of the relevant
population, and due to the importance of the sample to its customers, IRI makes an effort
to make the sample representative.  This is confirmed by unpublished analysis conducted
by the BLS.
In the Infoscan Data Base the data are aggregated by brand (for example different
size boxes are considered one brand), city
14 and quarter. The data covers up to 65
different cities (the exact number increases over time), and ranges from the first quarter
of 1989 to the last quarter of 1992.  The price variable was created by dividing the dollar
sales by the number of pounds sold.  Dollar sales reflect the price paid by consumers at
the cashier excluding discounts to manufacturer coupons.  Therefore, the resulting
variable is the city-brand-quarter average pre-coupon transaction price per pound.
                                                       
12 We distinguish this explanation from the intertemporal price discrimination story because
agency relationships in the firm may make it optimal for brand managers to lower prices and
issue coupons to meet market share goals, even if such decisions are not profit maximizing from
the firm’s perspective.  We hypothesize that managerial incentives to issue coupons may have
nothing to do with past or even current demand, unlike the intertemporal price discrimination
explanation.
13We are grateful to Ronald Cotterill, the director of the Food Marketing Center at the University
of Connecticut, for making these data available.
14Most of IRI’s definition of cities are similar, but not identical, to MSA’s.12
The coupon data were obtained from Promotion Information Management (PIM),
a research company that tracks coupons and other promotional strategies.  (For example,
General Mills might hire PIM to keep track of Kellogg’s couponing and vice-versa.)
PIM collects data on coupons issued in 69 major metropolitan areas, including all 65 of
the IRI areas.
15  For each region, PIM obtains information on coupon inserts in the local
newspapers (FSIs), on coupons run in the newspapers themselves (run-of-press) and on
coupons in magazines.  PIM also hires local residents to attempt to get on mailing lists to
receive direct mailings, often containing coupons.  Where they overlap, the PIM regions
are closely aligned with IRI’s geographic markets.  Since most coupons are issued
through inserts in newspapers, however, PIM’s markets are defined by the circulation of
the local newspaper and not strictly by the counties covered, as are IRI’s markets.  As a
result, we may have some measurement error, to the extent people in, for instance,
Hartford, Connecticut buy the Boston Globe instead of the Hartford Courant.  We
believe, however, that these measurement problems are limited.
We obtained information from PIM on coupons issued for every brand produced
by the top five cereal manufacturers from 1989 through 1992.
16  The information
consisted of the face value of the coupon, the cities where it was distributed, the
distributor, date on which it appeared and its expiration date.  The description of the
coupons also characterizes the requirements that must be met for the customer to redeem
the coupon, indicating, for instance, if the customer needed to buy two boxes of cereal to
get a discount, or send in proofs-of-purchase labels to get a rebate.  (The Appendix
contains a more detailed description of the PIM data.)
                                                       
15 The additional metropolitan areas covered by PIM are Greenville, SC, Charleston, WV, Quad
Cities and Tulsa, OK.  PIM also covers Richmond and Norfolk, VA separately, though for
purposes of comparison with the IRI data, we aggregate across the two cities.
16 The top five producers during this time period were Kellogg, General Mills, Post, Quaker Oats
and Nabisco.13
We matched the price and coupon data by city, brand and quarter.  If a coupon
spanned more than one quarter (for instance, if it was distributed in mid-February but did
not expire until the end of December) we assigned the coupon to the quarter in which it
was first issued.  Previous research has found that about 60 percent of coupons are used
in the first two months after they are issued (Bowman, 1980).  Altogether, we have
23,350 observations reflecting information on 25 brands of cereal over sixteen quarters
from 51 to 65 cities.  (Over the time period we are considering, IRI’s coverage expanded,
so that at the beginning of the sample, we only have information for 51 cities and by
1992, we have information from 65.)
4. EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRICES AND
COUPONS
Correlation Between Prices and Coupons
Empirically, we model the relationship between prices and coupons with the
following equation:
SHELF PRICE DOLLARS OFF bct b c c t t b bct bct = + + + + g f d e ( ) ( ) ( )   Eq. 1
where SHELF PRICEbct is the average shelf price for cereal brand b in city c during
quarter t and DOLLARS OFFbct is the value of the coupon available for cereal brand b in
city c during quarter t.
17  DOLLARS OFFbct takes on a value of zero when there is no
coupon available.  We also estimate versions of equation 1 which include COUPON
DUMMYbct, which equals one when there is a coupon available and zero when there is
not, instead of DOLLARS OFFbct.  gb and fc capture brand- and city-specific factors that
affect demand or the cost of selling cereal.  dt is included to capture the trend in cereal
                                                       
17 Note that we are assuming that coupons are only valid in the cities where they are distributed.
In fact that is not true, but we assume that there is limited transfer of coupons from one city to
another.14
prices over the time period we consider.  We also present estimates which allow the
brand-fixed effects to vary by city (we estimate gbc), the city-fixed effects to vary across
quarters (we estimate fct) and the quarter effects to vary by brand (we estimate dbt).
Table 1 summarizes the variables we analyze.  The average shelf price in our
sample is about three dollars per pound.  The bulk of the variation in shelf prices is across
brands.  The average discount offered through coupons is about 50 cents, and they are
available in 85 percent of the observations we consider, though as we discuss in the
Appendix, we suspect that the mean of this variable is high.
18,19  The average face value
of available coupons (i.e. the conditional mean) is about 55 cents.  We note the difference
between the breakdown in the variation of shelf prices and dollars off.  While the
variation in prices is largely explained by brand, city and quarter dummy variables, this is
not the case with coupons.  We shall return to this point below when we discuss the
explanatory power of our results.
Before we present the results, it is useful to consider how our empirical
specification identifies the relationship between prices and coupons.  Ideally, we would
like to have exogenous, or randomly assigned, variation in the distribution of coupons.  If
that were the case, we could identify the causal effect of couponing by comparing, for
example, the price of a brand in a certain city where a coupon was issued to the price of
the same brand in other similar cities where no coupons were issued.  Unfortunately, it is
very unlikely that coupons were issued (or “dropped”) at random.  Alternatively, we
could assume that coupons were issued at random conditional on observable variables.
For example, one could assume that for a given brand in a particular city the exact timing
                                                       
18 One problem we had to deal with when defining the data was that some of the coupons were
not attributed to individual cities but rather were defined as national coupons with a percent
coverage offered. We examined several assumptions, described in the Appendix, about how to
attribute these coupons to cities.  In general, our results are robust to a number of different
assumptions.
19 If more than one coupon was available, we took the mean value of the offered discounts.  Very
similar results obtain if we instead use the total value of all outstanding coupons or the maximum
value.15
of the coupon is random.  Using the richness of our data we are able to explore a variety
of such assumptions.
Table 2 presents a number of estimates of Equation 1.  Each column reports
coefficients from separate specifications that use either DOLLARS OFF or COUPON
DUMMY as the independent variable.  Both specifications in a column include the same
fixed effects.  Moving across the columns, the specifications include increasingly more
fixed-effects – the specifications in column I do not include any fixed effects while the
specifications in column VIII include city-brand effects (gbc), city-quarter effects (fct) and
brand-quarter effects (dbt).  Taken together, the results provide a description of the
relationship between coupons and prices within and between cities, brands and quarters.
The specification in column I provides an estimate of the average effect of
coupons on prices assuming that the couponing decision is determined at random.  For
obvious reasons, that is probably not a reasonable assumption.  Columns II through VIII
add more fixed effects to the model, and by doing so change the nature of the experiment.
For example, adding quarter fixed effects controls for an increase in the tendency to issue
coupons but still assumes that in a given quarter the coupons are issued at random across
cities and brands.  Adding city fixed effects (column III) allows for a correlation within a
city, but assumes that this correlation is fixed across brands.
Except for the coefficient on COUPON DUMMY in columns I through III, the
results through column VII suggest that shelf prices are negatively correlated with
coupons.
20  The negative relationship between prices and COUPON DUMMY is
statistically insignificant in Columns VI and VII.  Column VIII uses the most flexible
definition of fixed effects allowable in our data set, and the results in that column suggest
essentially no relationship between prices and coupons.  93 percent of the variance in the
dependent variable, however, is explained simply by including the brand, city and quarter
                                                       
20 The Appendix discusses several tests we performed to assess the possibility that the negative
correlation between prices and coupons is a result of the way our data are aggregated across box
size, weeks within a quarter and stores within a city.16
dummy variables and 98 percent is explained by the time we add all the fixed effects
(there are nearly 25*65 + 25*16 + 65*16 = 3065 estimated in total) in Column VIII.
Comparing the results across columns provides evidence on the relationship
between prices and coupons across cities, brands, and quarters.  Prices and couponing
(captured by both the number of coupons dropped, COUPON DUMMY, and discounts
offered through coupons, DOLLARS OFF) were both increasing over the time period
covered by our data set, so not surprisingly, controlling for quarter fixed effects in
Column II dampens the positive relationship between the two variables.  Coupons and
prices are positively correlated across cities implying that there is more couponing in
more expensive cities.  (Between estimates yield a coefficient of .33 on COUPON
DUMMY, but the relationship is also discernible from the difference between columns II
and III).  Prices and coupon discounts are negatively correlated across brands, implying
that higher valued coupons are issued for less expensive brands.  The effect is the
opposite for COUPON DUMMY, and fewer coupons are issued for the less expensive
brands.  (Neither of these effects is terribly strong in the between estimates.)
Slightly different patterns emerge when we estimate more flexible fixed effects.
Generally, the between city-brand effects are negative for DOLLARS OFF and positive
for COUPON DUMMY (column II vs. column V).  This suggests that there are higher
valued coupons for cereals that are priced below the city average cereal price, but fewer
of them.  The between brand-quarter effects are positive, suggesting that there are more
coupons for brands that sell for more of a premium in a particular quarter than the simple
average quarter price suggests.  The between city-quarter effects are positive, suggesting
that there are more coupons in cities with more inflation.
If the fixed effects that we add in the later columns of Table 2 are correlated with
the independent variables (either DOLLARS OFF or COUPON DUMMY), the results in
the earlier column that did not include these fixed effects are suspect.  We can obtain a
measure of the bias reflected in the coefficients reported in the early columns of Table 2
by comparing the fixed-effect results to random-effects specifications.  A random-effects17
specification assumes that the excluded effects are uncorrelated with the independent
variables so that a regression without these effects will yield consistent but inefficient
estimates, as will a fixed-effects estimator.  If, on the other hand, the excluded effects are
correlated with the couponing measure than a random-effects estimator will be biased.
This has been widely used to construct a Hausman test for the null that the effects are not
systematically correlated with the independent variables (Hausman, 1978).
We performed Hausman tests on six sets of fixed effects: city, quarter, brand,
city-brand, city-quarter and brand-quarter.  In all cases save one, the data does not reject
the equality of the random effects and fixed effects estimators, suggesting that the
changes in the estimated values of the coefficients between the different columns of
Table 2 are not due to correlation between unobserved effects and the couponing
measure.  The one case where the Hausman test rejected the null was for city-brand
effects.  This suggests that only those columns in Table 2 that include the interacted city-
brand dummies are unbiased.  The Hausman tests also provide us with some guidance in
interpreting the additional explanations for coupons, suggesting that explanations that
predict systematic differences in couponing practices for brands by city are more valid
than explanations, that, for instance, predict systematic differences for brand over time.
For instance, if coupons are being used to stave off generic competition, we might expect
them to be correlated with brand-specific price increases over time.  That is not the case.
Instead, if coupons are issued as a strategic response to a competitor’s coupon strategy in
a particular city, we would expect them to be correlated with city-brand effects.
In general, the effect suggested by the results is small.  The largest coefficient on
DOLLARS OFF (column III) suggests that the shelf price decreases by ten cents (less
than three percent of both the average price and the standard deviation in price) when a
coupon for 55 cents (the average coupon size in our data) is introduced.  However, it is
likely that due to the aggregation of the data, the independent variable is measured with
some error, suggesting the coefficients are biased downward.  It is well known that this
bias is augmented by the use of within estimators.  Following Griliches and Hausman
(1986) we are able to use the panel structure of our data to both test for measurement18
error and also correct the bias.  For example, first-difference estimation of the coefficient
on DOLLARS OFF in column V of Table 2 yields a coefficient of –.02, while an eight
quarter difference estimator yields a coefficient of –.09.  This pattern is consistent with
the existence of measurement error.  Using a partial implementation of the Griliches-
Hausman method to correct for this bias we obtain a coefficient of –.22.  We conclude
that the effects are not as small as they might seem.
Taken together, the results in Table 2 suggest that coupons do not have a positive
effect on prices, at least for the brands, years and cities our data cover.  If one is willing
to accept that the fixed effects control for all potential endogeneity problems, then these
results suggest that manufacturers do not view coupons primarily as price discriminatory
mechanisms, at least as predicted by static models of monopoly price discrimination.
However, it is possible that even in the most unrestricted specification there is still a
systematic component in the error term that is correlated with the couponing decision.
Given the extremely high R
2 that seems unlikely, though it is still a possibility.  Even if
the results presented in Table 2 do not fully rule out this possibility they strongly suggest
that coupons are not merely a tool that allow firms to price discriminate.  Rather there are
additional factors that are jointly influencing pricing and couponing decisions, and the
effects of these factors seem to dominate the effects of price discrimination.
In order to shed light on some of the possible factors influencing couponing and
pricing, the remainder of this section documents a number of patterns across brands,
across cities and over time, the very effects Table 2 controls for.  While we attempt to
organize the discussion of the facts around certain possible explanations for the results in
Table 2, we also simply intend to document the trends and leave formulation and testing
of specific hypotheses for future research.
Cross-Brand Effects19
Table 3 describes coupon issues by type of cereal and by manufacturer.
21,22
Across manufacturers, there seems to be a relationship between size and couponing.  The
manufacturers are arranged from left to right in order of their market share within the
industry, and the number of coupons per brand decreases almost monotonically across the
bottom row of Table 3.  (Kellogg offers more coupons with restrictions than General
Mills, so when we include restricted coupons in Table 3, Kellogg issues more per brand
than General Mills.)  The manufacturer effects primarily drive differences by type of
cereal, although most manufacturers coupon less heavily in the “Kids” category.
Table 4 describes the patterns in coupon issues over time, documenting a
significant increase in the number of coupons issued over the time period we consider.
There were nearly 60 percent more coupons issued in 1992 than in 1989.  Surveys of
coupon practices across all consumer goods manufacturers also document increases
between 1989 and 1992, though not quite as dramatic as for cereals.   No distinct pattern
in couponing across quarters holds during all four years.
One possible explanation for the negative relationship between coupons and
prices is that the manufacturers facing particularly intense competition from generic
manufacturers are both couponing heavily and reducing prices.
23  To evaluate that
hypothesis, we obtained additional data on sales of generic products (see Wongtrakool,
1994), including information on the market shares of the ten leading generic brands in
1991 and 1992.  Two of these generic products compete directly with cereals that are not
in our sample (apple cinnamon toasted oats and bran flakes), but the rest provide
competition for nine of the brands in our sample.
24  While brands with heavy generic
                                                       
21 Table A1 in the Appendix lists the brands in our sample by segment.
22 Note that the data in Tables 3 and 4 represent the total number of coupon issues, including
issues for the same brand in the same quarter and city.
23 Note, however, that the fact that the relationship between prices and coupons is positive
between brand-quarters is inconsistent with this hypothesis.
24 The brands facing strong generic competition are: Cheerios, Corn Flakes, Frosted Flakes, Rice
Crispies, Raisin Bran (both Kellogg and Post), Lucky Charms, Froot Loops and Honey Nut
Cheerios.20
competition tended to coupon more, brands that do not face heavy generic competition
showed higher increases in the number of coupons dropped over the time period we
consider.  Also, couponing practices within the brands facing strong generic competition
was negatively correlated with increases in generic sales.
It is also possible that the promotion activities of other branded manufacturers
influence the competitive environment within which couponing decisions are made.  As
discussed in section two, price discrimination in an oligopoly setting can, under certain
assumptions, cause all prices to fall.  Essentially, if prices are strategic complements and
consumers have heterogeneous preferences over cereals, a rival’s coupon may cause a
seller to issue a coupon and lower its shelf price.  To evaluate that description of our data,
we estimated specifications similar to those reported in Table 2, and included an
interaction between COUPON DUMMY and a variable indicating whether or not
competitors had valid coupons for “similar” products.
25  The results are reported in
Table 5.
The results are sensitive to the presence of fixed-effects, and more so than the
results in Table 2.  The interaction term is positive until we introduce brand effects, and
then it is negative and significant in specifications IV through VII.
26  The negative
coefficient on the interaction term supports the hypothesis that coupons are more likely to
accompany price reductions when they are contemporaneous with a competitor’s coupon.
This suggests that coupons introduced independently of competitors’ have the effect on
prices predicted by theories of monopoly price discrimination.  The confounding effects
of monopolistic and oligopolistic price discrimination may explain the results in Table 2.
It is also interesting to note that the coefficient on COMPETITORS COUPON becomes
                                                       
25 “Similar” products are defined as cereals classified in the same row of Table 3.
COMPETITORS’ COUPON is equal to mean of COUPON DUMMY across competing
manufacturers’ brands in the same product category during the same quarter in the same city.
The mean of the variable across all observations is .85.  The mean of the interaction between
COMPETITORS’ COUPON and COUPON DUMMY is .73.
26 The importance of the brand effects suggests that the manufacturers are offering competing
coupons more often for more expensive brands.21
positive.  This is consistent with a model in which a competitor’s coupon lures the lower
valuation, and more price-sensitive, consumers thus increasing the optimal price for the
remaining customers.
While the interpretation we offer in the previous paragraph is intriguing, we offer
it with some trepidation.  First, the product categories are admittedly somewhat ad hoc,
although the coefficients on the interaction terms are insensitive to small changes in the
categories.  Second, it is possible that the coefficient on the interaction term is picking up
an omitted variable that influences all manufacturers’ decisions to coupon.  Such an
effect is harder to reconcile with the results that include extensive fixed effects, so we
have more confidence in the results at the bottom of Table 5.  Third, looking at the simple
correlation in couponing activity by city-quarter, we find more correlation across brands
within a manufacturer than across manufacturers within segments.  For example, the
correlation between the mean of COUPON DUMMY for a given city-quarter for Kellogg
and General Mills in the All Family category is .21, while the correlation between the
mean of COUPON DUMMY for Kellogg All Family and Kellogg’s Taste-
Enhanced/Wholesome is .60.  Similarly, Kellogg’s Raisin Bran is much more likely to
have a coupon in a given city at the same time as Kellogg’s Froot Loops than at the same
time as Post Raisin Bran.
We also considered patterns in each manufacturer’s couponing activity over time.
In conversations with us, brand managers for several consumer products indicated that
coupons are often used to provide short-term boosts in market share, in order, for
instance, to meet goals set by the firm.  To confirm this, we considered patterns in
couponing approaching the end of each company’s fiscal year.  Conveniently, the five
companies in our sample have fiscal years that end in three different months.
27  Fiscal-
year end effects were most evident for General Mills and Kellogg, as Kellogg issued 15
percent more coupons in the last quarter than in any other quarter, and General Mills
                                                       
27 Kellogg, Post (a subsidiary of the Philip Morris Companies) and Nabisco (a subsidiary of RJR
Nabisco) all have fiscal years ending in December.  General Mills’ fiscal year ends in May, and
Quaker’s fiscal year ends in June.22
issued from 10 to 15 percent more in the first and second quarters.  Post is most active in
the fourth quarter before its December fiscal year end, although the increase over other
quarters is not substantial.  Fiscal year end effects were not evident for Quaker and
Nabisco, but perhaps that is because we observe coupons for so few of their brands.  We
observe similar patterns in advertising (and, generally, advertising expenditures and
couponing are positively correlated) contributing to the view that manufacturers are using
coupons, and other promotional devices, for short-run sales boosts.
 Cross-City Effects
 
Coupons and prices are positively correlated across cities.  A number of
exogenous factors that vary across cities (for instance, population density and per capita
income) may explain that result.  The organization of the retail grocery sector also varies
across cities and plausibly can give us some insight into our results relating coupons to
prices.
Table 6 documents coupon issues in several cities, and demonstrates considerable
heterogeneity in couponing across them.  The first column lists the total number of
coupons issued in a particular city over the time period we study.  The middle column
lists the average discount offered per coupon in dollars.  The last column lists the sum of
the discounts offered divided by the total number of quarters covered by our data (16).
This number represents the total savings a consumer could have achieved per quarter had
they used every coupon issued in that city.  The differences are considerable, and
residents in Dallas were exposed to about 33 percent more coupons than were residents of
Little Rock.  The low number of coupons for Boston is somewhat misleading because
Boston received more coupons with restrictions than unrestricted coupons, and is actually
one of the most heavily couponed cities when we include restricted coupons.
Table 7 analyzes the relationship between several city-level variables and both the
percent of brand-quarters during which a coupon was available in a given city (columns I,23
II and III) and the average price for cereal across the 25 brands (column IV).
28  In column
I, COUPON DUMMY is only positive if there is an unrestricted coupon available, while
columns II and III consider patterns in all types of coupons.  Column III considers the
sub-sample of cities for which we have price data over all four years.  All sets of
regressions include region fixed-effects, although the coefficients on the other variables
are essentially unchanged if we omit these.
29
The first two variables, % SUPERMARKETS and GROCERY CR4, measuring
broad differences in the organization of the retail sector, are never significant in any of
the specifications.
30  The absence of a relationship between couponing and the retail
market structure casts doubt on explanations, such as the one discussed in section 2, that
competition among the retailers affects pricing responses to coupons.
We included STORES DOUBLING because managers suggested to us that they
were more likely to coupon in cities where the local stores were willing to take steps to
ensure that promotions successfully increased market share.  Confirming this, the
variable is positively correlated with the total number of coupons (restricted plus
unrestricted) a city receives, although it is negatively correlated with the number of
unrestricted coupons cities receive.  Most restricted coupons (e.g. buy one get one free)
are not doubled, so it is possible that DOUBLING proxies for other steps local stores will
take to push brands, and manufacturers avoid inflicting the direct costs of unrestricted
coupons on those stores.
Doubling is also positively correlated with prices.  This could suggest that there is
a causal relationship between the level of couponing activity and prices, consistent with
                                                       
28 The city-level variables are described in the Appendix.
29 We will not discuss the coefficients on the last six variables in Table 7, which we included as
controls for city demographic characteristics.  We include % HISPANIC because several
marketing articles suggest that Hispanic-Americans are less likely to use coupons than Anglo-
Americans (see, e.g., Green, 1997).
30 The lack of correlation is not due to collinearity between the retail market structure and other
city-level attributes, because the variables are not significant in univariate specifications.24
discriminatory pricing across cities.  Other variables, however, that are plausibly
exogenous to pricing are positively correlated with couponing but not with price.  We
included NEWSPAPER DUOPOLY as a proxy for the costs associated with running
advertisements with coupons in the local papers.  Confirming this interpretation, it is
positively correlated with the total number of coupons issued per city.  There is very little




We next investigate the dynamic effects of couponing.  We examine two separate,
but related, questions. First, we consider whether a decision to coupon is a function of
previous quantities sold.  Next, we look at the relationship between quantity sold and
previous coupons offered.  Since our goal is primarily to describe the dynamic relations
between the endogenous variables we employ a panel vector auto-regressive (VAR)
model and try to impose as little structure on the data as possible.
Let the dynamic relations between discounts offered by a coupon, shelf price and






























and ubct  is white noise with a diagonal variance matrix, V.  This system consists of a
couponing equation, a pricing equation and a demand equation.  Assuming 
1
0
- B exists we
can re-write the structural VAR, given in equation 2, as a reduced form VAR, given by
                                                       
31 We estimated a specification similar to column IV of Table 7, which included COUPON
DUMMY as an independent variable and instrumented for it with NEWSPAPER DUOPOLY.  The
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Note that in the reduced form the contemporaneous effects of the endogenous variables
are absorbed in the variance matrix of the errors.
Without the city-brand specific effects equation 3 can be estimated using OLS.
Once the equation includes city-brand effects OLS no longer yields consistent estimates.
Furthermore, it is well known that simply adding city-brand specific dummy variables to
the estimated equations will not solve the problem (for a discussion see Chamberlain,
1983).  Below we follow Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988) by first differencing the
data and using past levels of the variables as instrumental variables.
 
 The results are presented in Table 8.  The first three columns in the table present
the results for each of the endogenous variables, allowing for four lags in each of the
variables, city-brand effects and quarterly dummy variables.  The last three columns
present the results for the same three equations without allowing for the city-brand or
quarter effects.
 
  The results in the column I through III of Table 8 suggest that coupons and prices
Granger-cause volume but not vice versa.  Prices and coupons, on the other hand, seem to
impact each other with some lag.  An interesting relation is suggested by the coefficients
in column III.  All lags of both the COUPON DUMMY and SHELF PRICE are correlated
with current volume.  However, the effect of price is decreasing over time, so longer lags
are of smaller economic significance, while for coupons the effect is roughly constant.
The signs of the coefficients suggest that a price decrease embodied in a coupon has the
opposite effect of a reduction in the shelf price.  Everything else constant, lower past
shelf prices imply lower current demand, a result that is generally consistent with the
Sobel (1984) theory of timing of sales.  A past discount offered by a coupon has the26
opposite effect on volume, supporting one general theme of our results: coupons are not
merely price cuts.
 
 Before we discuss how these results shed light on the dynamic theories discussed
in section two, we note a few more results.  First, the OLS regression presented in
column IV has a low R-squared compared to the values in columns V and VI.  This is
typical of our results: a smaller proportion of the variance in the coupon variable is
explained by the model.  Second, all of the qualitative results discussed here are the same
if we replace the COUPON DUMMY variable with DOLLARS OFF.
 
  In order to discuss the economic interpretation of the results we examine the
MA(4) representation of the VAR model which is given by
. ... 2 2 1 1 ￿
¥
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 The matrix l Y  measures the effect of a shock to  l t- e  on the rest of the system holding
everything else constant, i.e., ' / t l t l y e ¶ ¶ = Y + . A plot of the  l Y  over l is called the
impulse response function and it captures all the information on how the shocks  l t- e
affect the evolution of the endogenous variables in system described by equation 3.  The
matrices  l Y  can easily be computed recursively from the estimates of the reduced-form
VAR (see Hamilton, 1994).
 
  The impulse response function based on equation 4 ignores the correlation
between the shocks in the various equations, since it measures the effect of one shock
holding everything else fixed.  We recall that the correlation in these errors was
introduced when we switched from the structural VAR model, given in equation 2, to the
reduced-form VAR, given by equation 3.  Therefore, a different question to ask is what
the effect of a shock to the (orthogonal) structural error on the endogenous variables
would be?  In order to answer that question we need to recover the structural parameters,
in particular the contemporaneous effects captured by 0 B .  Without additional
assumptions these effects cannot be identified.  We explored several sets of27
assumptions
32 and use them to construct orthogonal impulse response functions.  Since
the variance matrix of the residuals, presented in the bottom of Table 8, is nearly diagonal
the results were nearly identical to those presented below and therefore are not discussed
here.  In all cases the structural parameter on COUPON DUMMY in the pricing equation
was nearly identical to those presented in Table 2.  Figure 1 displays various impulse
response functions.  Each graph displays the effects of a one standard deviation positive
shock to the various error terms on the three different variables.
 
 The results in Table 8 clearly suggest that manufacturers’ decisions to coupon are
not a function of previous quantities sold.  Lagged values of quantity do not increase
either the likelihood of introducing a coupon or the face value of the coupon.  Section
two also discussed two theories of the dynamic effects on demand.  The first was in the
spirit of Sobel (1984).  This theory suggests a path-dependence in the impact of price
cuts. Everything else equal, fewer price cuts (whether in the form of lower prices or in the
form of discounts) in the past lead to higher current demand.  The impact of lagged prices
on volume is consist with this theory – all else equal, lower lagged prices decrease
current demand.  Also the negative correlation in the coupon variable is consistent with
this theory.  However, this theory is not consistent with the estimated effects of lagged
coupons on volume.  This does seem to suggest that this theory of the dynamic effects of
coupons is not consistent with the data.
 
 The final dynamic effect discussed in section two was an advertising effect.
Coupons may induce consumers to try new brands, making them more likely to purchase
the product in the future.  Both the facts that coupons have a different impact than price
cuts, and that their impact is somewhat long lasting are consistent with this theory.  This
                                                       
 
32 The first assumption we used was to restrict the VAR model given in equation 2 to be
recursive, which implies that the matrix 0 B  is lower triangular and therefore uniquely determined
by the Cholesky decomposition of the variance matrix of the residuals. We ordered the variables
so that DOLLARS OFF at time t is not impacted by the value of either SHELF PRICE or
VOLUME at time t, SHELF PRICE is only a function of DOLLARS OFF, while VOLUME is a
function of both the other variables. We also explored sign restrictions on the various coefficients.
These assumptions were not sufficient to identify the parameters, however, they allowed us to
bound the admissible parameter space.  The bounds were tight.28





This paper documents the patterns of prices and coupons in the RTE cereal
industry.  Both the negative correlation between prices and coupons and the dynamic
results suggest that monopoly price discrimination models are not as important as
economists might expect and that coupons and price discounts are complements rather
than substitutes.  We considered evidence bearing on several additional explanations for
coupons.  The results seem to suggest that strategic interactions between manufacturers
are important to understanding coupons, as are the incentives given to the people within
firms who make decisions about coupons.  We are less optimistic that explanations based
on dynamic demand effects or the vertical relationship between cereal manufacturers and
retailers are applicable.
The number of coupons issued by all consumer goods manufacturers grew at over
ten percent a year between 1980 and 1995.  As our data demonstrate, cereal
manufacturers contributed to this growth.  Recently, however, a number of manufacturers
have tried to curtail or completely stop couponing.  In 1995, for instance, General Mills
announced that it would no longer issue coupons but would instead commit to “every day
low prices.”  The commitment did not last, however, and General Mills resumed issuing
coupons.  (Note that no other cereal manufacturers followed General Mills in 1995.)  In
1996, Procter & Gamble and nine other consumer products manufacturers stopped
issuing coupons in three cities in upstate New York.  Consumers met this announcement
with revolt, staging boycotts of Procter & Gamble’s products and convincing local
politicians to take on the issue.  The companies resumed couponing and eventually paid
$4.2 million to settle charges that they had colluded to agree to stop issuing coupons.
                                                                                                                                                                    
 
33 Because we are studying the top-25 cereal brands, many of which have existed since the early
1900’s, we expected a priori that we would find evidence consistent with price discrimination and
would not observe brand trial effects.29
The fact that manufacturers seem to dislike coupons lends credence to our finding
that coupons are not profit-enhancing price discriminatory mechanisms.  (Procter &
Gamble's senior vice president for advertising and market research told the Wall Street
Journal, "I don't like couponing. Period," Narisetti (1997).)  General Mill’s claim that
they would lower shelf prices when they stopped couponing appears inconsistent with our
findings but may either reflect the long-run costs of couponing or may be a public
relations gesture more than a description of a new pricing policy.  Clearly more work
needs to be done to buttress our findings, but preliminary results suggest that coupons are
not good examples of monopoly third-degree price discrimination.
There are many possible extensions to our work.  Since our results suggest that
seller decisions about prices and coupons are inconsistent with the simple textbook view
of coupons as price discrimination tools, there is scope for more theoretical work on the
rationales for coupons.  We have tried to supply as many "stylized facts" as possible to
motivate such work.  Armed with additional theory one could reexamine our data with a
structural model, which could measure the effects of various couponing strategies.30
Data Appendix
This Appendix contains more details on our data beginning with a description of
the coupon data used throughout section 4, and then describing the city-level variables
used in Table 7.
COUPON DATA
We made several decisions and assumptions in constructing the coupon data set.  Here
we describe those decisions, and discuss the sensitivity of our results to them.
Percent National
The coupon data from PIM are organized by brand and, within brands, by the
month on which the coupon was dropped.  Within a brand-month, there are usually
several entries (anywhere from zero to thirty-five), distinguishing coupons dropped by
different distributors, dropped on a different day within the month or distributed to
different cities.  For most entries, the exact cities to which the coupon was distributed are
listed.  For some, however, the data indicate simply that a coupon was targeted to a
certain percent of the national market.  For some of these percent national coupons, we
can identify the exact cities they were targeting (e.g. because they are distributed to 100
percent of the national market).  For most entries listing the percent national, however,
we developed an algorithm for assigning the coupons to specific cities.  Specifically, if a
percent national coupon was listed, we allocated it to all cities that were not individually
cited on other entries issued by the same distributor on the same date.  We calculated the
probability that those cities received a coupon based on the target percent of the national
market divided by the percent of the national market for which they accounted.  In other
words, if 40 percent of the cities received individual coupons and there was a coupon
targeted at 20 percent of the national market, we assumed that the remaining 60 percent
of the cities received a coupon with probability one-third.
We experimented with a number of different methods for allocating the percent
national, and our results are not sensitive to the specific algorithm we use.  (Some of the
algorithms we considered included assigning percent national coupons with greater than
80 percent coverage to all cities or aligning coupons not only on date and distributor but
also on restrictions and cents-off discount.)  Also, we checked the coupons in our data set
versus the coupons recorded in the free-standing inserts distributed through the local
papers in Atlanta and Boston, and found a high level of accuracy.  If anything, we
attributed more coupons to the cities than were actually distributed, suggesting to us that
the mean of COUPON DUMMY in Table 1 is too high.  The algorithm we use will
overstate the percent of cities with a coupon for a given brand if some of the percent
national coupons were allocated to cities that already were getting a coupon from the
same distributor on the same day.  For instance, Grape Nuts might offer a 50-cent coupon
to 80 percent of the national market and a 35-cent coupon in Boston on the same day.
Our algorithm assumes that Boston did not get the 50-cent coupon since it was already
getting the 35-cent coupon, but it’s possible that Boston got two coupons – one for 3531
cents and one for 50 cents.  As a result of this attribute of our data, however, we are least
confident in results that rely on cross-city comparisons.
Restrictions
In the results presented, we exclude all coupons that required the consumer either
to purchase another product, such as another cereal, or to send in proofs of purchase.  We
do this because assigning values to most of theses coupons is difficult (e.g. the coupon
will guarantee to cover the cost of the purchase of a can of coffee, up to a certain limit).
We also have information on PIM’s estimates of the direct costs the manufacturer will
incur redeeming the coupons.  (The estimates are made by PIM using industry accepted
redemption rates for certain types of coupons and distribution vehicles.)  Based on those
estimates, the coupons with restrictions that we exclude are not nearly as widely used as
coupons without restrictions.  Finally, results obtained including coupons involving
restrictions are similar to the ones we present (unless otherwise noted).
Aggregation
Most studies of coupons use transaction level data and incorporate specific
information about the buyer.  We have opted to use data with richer cross-sectional and
time-series properties, though in order to do that we need to use data that aggregates over
transactions along several dimensions.  We performed several tests to evaluate the extent to
which the aggregation is affecting our results.
AGGREGATION BY BOX SIZE: The SHELF PRICE variable was created by
dividing the dollar sales by the number of pounds sold.  Cereal is sold in boxes of
different sizes (generally between 10 and 20 ounces) and the price per pound varies by
box size, tending to lower for larger boxes.  If consumers systematically buy cereal in
either larger or smaller boxes when coupons are available, the correlation we observe
between prices and coupons will reflect this.
There are several reasons to believe that the patterns of box size sales would vary
based on the availability of a coupon.  For one, coupons may convince consumers to buy
a brand that they otherwise would not have (so that their box-size choice will change the
average box size) and some coupons only apply to bigger box sizes.  We evaluated the
extent to which such an effect is influencing our results by excluding coupons that
imposed some size restriction on purchases.  The results with the smaller subset of
coupons were similar to those presented in Table 2.  Coupons may also draw consumers
who buy larger sizes into the cereal market, if, for instance, consumers with larger
households are more likely to change their buying behavior in response to a coupon
promotion.  It is also conceivable that coupons will induce people to buy smaller boxes
since the deduction offered by the coupon represents a larger fraction of the price.  In that
case, the results in Table 2 would understate the negative correlation between coupons
and shelf prices.32
AGGREGATION OVER A QUARTER: The pricing information we have also
represents the average over a quarter.  The negative correlation between prices and
coupons we report in Table 5 would misstate the true relationship if sellers increased
prices for a short time immediately after they issued a coupon and then lowered prices
(below the level at which they set them in quarters without coupons) for the rest of the
quarter.  While somewhat contrived, this behavior would be consistent with the idea that
sellers use coupons to price discriminate immediately following the coupon drop and then
lower them to encourage coupon users to buy the product again.  (This could be rational
if consumers form product preferences over time – eventually the seller could raise the
price.)
We evaluated the extent to which the aggregation by quarter is affecting our results
by developing a variable to measure the number of coupons that were issued in a city for a
particular brand during a quarter.  We only considered coupons to be distinct if they were
issued more than seven days apart.  On average if a coupon is issued at all, 1.6 coupons are
issued per quarter and the maximum number issued over a quarter is 5  When we included
the number of coupons issued over the quarter along with the coupon dummy variable in
specifications similar to those in Table 2, the results suggest that a larger number of
coupons are associated with lower average prices.  That suggests the negative correlation
between prices and coupons is contemporaneous.
AGGREGATION ACROSS GROCERY STORES: Our data also aggregate across grocery
stores, though since nearly all grocery stores accept coupons, each store faces the same
incentive to change cereal prices in response to coupons.  One could imagine that coupons
might lead people to shop at more expensive stores, suggesting that the results in Table 2
understate the negative correlation between coupons and prices at a given store.  It is hard
to believe, however, that customers change their behavior in response to a coupon for one
product.
CITY-LEVEL DATA
Table 7 reports results relating various city-level variables to pricing and couponing
by city.  The source for all variables, except DOUBLING, was the IRI Infoscan Data Base
at the University of Connecticut, Food Marketing Center.  We obtained the information to
construct DOUBLING in personal correspondence with IRI.  Except where noted, we have
annual information for all variables between 1989 and 1992.  We do not have information
about DOUBLING in Shreveport, MS, so we limit the cross-city comparisons to 64 cities.
Definitions and summary statistics for the city-level variables are as follows.
% SUPERMARKETS – measures the percent of food sold through supermarkets, where a
supermarket is defined as a full-line, self-service food store with annual volume of $2
million or more.
(64-city mean = .74, standard deviation = .04)
GROCERY CR4 – measures the 4-firm concentration ratio across owners of both grocery
stores and supermarkets.33
(64-city mean = .65, standard deviation = .13)
STORES DOUBLING – measures the percent of sales volume through stores that offer to
double and/or triple manufacturers’ coupons.  For each city, we take the average
information over the last three quarters of 1992, the earliest dates for which we have
information.
(64-city mean = .42, standard deviation = .34)
NEWSPAPER DUOPOLY – is a dummy variable equal to one if the city is served by
more than one Sunday newspaper.  We constructed this variable based on the major
newspapers tracked by PIM.
(64-city mean = .09, standard deviation = .29)
NUMBER HH – measures the number of households in the city.
(64-city mean = 938,000, standard deviation = 997,000)
% LOW INCOME – measures the percent of households with incomes below $10,000 per
year.
(64-city mean = .15, standard deviation = .03)
% HIGH INCOME – measures the percent of households with incomes above $50,000
per year.
(64-city mean = .24, standard deviation = .06)
MEDIAN AGE – measures the median age within the city
(64-city mean = 33.2, standard deviation = 2.2)
FAMILY SIZE – measures the median household size
(64-city mean = 2.6, standard deviation = .13)
% HISPANIC – measures the fraction of each city’s population that is Hispanic.
(64-city mean = .07, standard deviation = .12)34
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Table 1: Summary Statistics






DOLLARS OFF    ($) .50 .49 .22 13.1% 5.6% 6.2%
COUPON DUMMY .85 .96 .30 10.7% 3.7% 4.1%
SHELF PRICE ($/lb) 2.97 2.94 .63 78.3% 7.6% 7.4%38
Table 2: Estimates of the Relationship between Shelf Price and Coupon Value
Dependent Variable is SHELF PRICE
Specification
I II III IV
DOLLARS OFF -.009 -.167 -.180 -.065
(.031) (.034) (.031) (.008)
Adj. R
2
.0000 .074 .148 .930
COUPON DUMMY .098 .030 .016 -.040
(.020) (.020) (.017) (.006)
Adj. R
2
.002 .071 .144 .930
Fixed-Effects
Estimated:
None Quarter Quarter, City Quarter, City,
Brand
# Observations 23,350 23,350 23,350 23,350
Specification
V VI VII VIII
DOLLARS OFF -.050 -.065 -.023 -.001
(.008) (.014) (.008) (.007)
Adj. R
2
.954 .950 .98 .99
COUPON DUMMY -.037 -.012 -.007 .0001
(.006) (.010) (.006) (.005)
Adj. R
2












# Observations 23,350 23,350 23,350 23,350
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.  They are robust to the presence of
heteroskedasticity and adjust for correlation in the errors within a brand of cereal in a
particular city.39




























































Total per brand 1,773 1,926 1,609 1,417 1,055 1,737
Note: This table lists the number of coupons issued by company by segment.  Coupons
issued by the same distributor on the same day but in different cities are counted as separate
coupons, as are coupons issued during the same quarter in the same city, but on different
days or by different distributors.  The number of brands per cell is listed in parentheses.
Table 4: Number of Coupon Issues by Quarter
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Total
1989 2,268 2,298 2,194 1,667 8,427
1990 2,768 2,096 2,415 2,369 9,648
1991 2,859 2,473 2,794 3,749 11,875
1992 3,488 3,476 3,204 3,304 13,472
Total 13,095 11,601 10,607 11,089 43,422
Note: This table lists the number of coupons issued by quarter.  The definition of a single
coupon is explained in the notes to Table 3.40
Table 5: The Relationship between Shelf Price and Coupon Value in the Presence of
Competitors’ Coupons
Dependent Variable is SHELF PRICE
Specification
I II III IV
COUPON DUMMY .110 -.014 -.118 .072
(.070) (.084) (.065) (.017)
COMPETITORS’ COUPON -.224 -.507 -.667 .085













.007 .087 .167 .931
Fixed-Effects Estimated: None Quarter Quarter, City Quarter, City,
Brand
# Observations 23,350 23,350 23,350 23,350
Specification
V VI VII VIII
COUPON DUMMY .064 .068 .012 -.001
(.017) (.023) (.009) (.008)
COMPETITORS’ COUPON .071 .059 -.004 -.007























# Observations 23,350 23,350 23,350 23,350
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.  They are robust to the presence of
heteroskedasticity and adjust for correlation in the errors within a brand of cereal in a
particular city.41
Table 6: Coupon Issues for Select Cities




Boston 504 .50 15.87
Little Rock 589 .57 20.94
Albany 598 .59 21.86
Columbus 612 .58 22.11
San Francisco 645 .60 24.23
Los Angeles 673 .42 17.83
Denver 726 .63 28.45
Dallas 785 .70 34.32
65-city AVERAGE 630 .59 23.18
            STANDARD
            DEVIATION
58 .04 3.30
Note: Column I lists the total number of coupons issued during a quarter in several cities.
The definition of a single coupon is explained in the notes to Table 3.  Columns II and III
list, respectively, the average discount on the typical coupon in each city, and the total
discount per quarter for each city.42






I II III IV
% SUPERMARKETS -.733 .018 -.020 1.19
(.451) (.059) (.061) (.82)
GROCERY CR4 .026 -.011 -.011 -.139
(.034) (.011) (.014) (.161)
STORES DOUBLING -.011 .011 .009 .142
(.018) (.005) (.006) (.072)
NEWSPAPER DUOPOLY -.033 .011 .009 .037
(.027) (.006) (.007) (.108)
ln(NUMBER HH) .043 .007 .008 -.064
(.021) (.004) (.005) (.100)
% LOW INCOME -.083 -.179 -.192 2.41
(.438) (.088) (.106) (1.61)
% HIGH INCOME -.235 -.063 -.050 1.95
(.263) (.058) (.066) (1.03)
MEDIAN AGE -.002 -.002 -.002 .011
(.006) (.001) (.002) (.031)
FAMILY SIZE -.085 -.019 -.024 -.149
(.074) (.023) (.027) (.448)
% HISPANIC .036 .008 -.024 .273
(.050) (.019) (.027) (.269)
R
2
.48 .55 .58 .42
# Observations 64 64 51 51
Note: This table reports coefficients from OLS estimates.  All estimates include dummy
variables for six geographic regions (the seventh is omitted).  Robust standard errors are in
parentheses.43
Table 8: VAR Estimates of the Dynamics of Coupon Existence, Shelf Price, and
Volume










COUPON DUMMY t-1 -.025 -.019 .011*** .159*** -.018*** -.000
(.040) (.015) (.003) (.010) (.003) (.001)
COUPON DUMMY t-2 .126*** -.019* .007*** .249*** -.002 -.001
(.030) (.011) (.002) (.011) (.003) (.001)
COUPON DUMMY t-3 -.023 -.029*** .005*** .016** -.009*** -.003***
(.017) (.007) (.001) (.008) (.003) (.001)
COUPON DUMMY t-4 .047*** -.023*** .006*** .078*** -.009*** .001
(.012) (.005) (.001) (.009) (.003) (.001)
SHELF PRICEt-1 -.080 .470*** .055** .084*** .667*** .010***
(.224) (.121) (.028) (.018) (.013) (.003)
SHELF PRICEt-2 -.225*** .167*** .020** -.086*** .237*** .004
(.078) (.043) (.010) (.019) (.016) (.003)
SHELF PRICEt-3 -.123*** -.065*** .014*** -.056*** -.038*** -.008**
(.031) (.018) (.004) (.022) (.015) (.004)
SHELF PRICEt-4 -.119*** .158*** .013*** .072*** .144*** -.006*
(.032) (.020) (.004) (.019) (.012) (.003)
VOLUMEt-1 .259 .222 -.129 .003 .282*** .402***
(.448) (.225) (.191) (.060) (.036) (.030)
VOLUMEt-2 .174 -.157 -.078 .089 -.086** .256***
(.243) (.123) (.140) (.071) (.036) (.033)
VOLUMEt-3 .056 .003 -.159 -.133** .039 .021
(.147) (.077) (.100) (.062) (.036) (.034)
VOLUMEt-4 .078 -.101 .172** .040 -.266*** .342***








Quarter -- -- --
Variance-Covariance of Residuals:
COUPON DUMMY .0899 .0574
SHELF PRICE -.0040 .0215 -.0009 .0133
VOLUME .0012 -.0010 .0011 .00005 -.0010 .0011
R
2
-- -- -- .17 .97 .98
# Obs 15,375 15,375 15,375 16,850 16,850 16,850
Note: Asymptotic robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1%
level.44
Figure 1: Impulse-Response Functions of the Dynamics of Coupon Existence, Shelf Price, and Volume45
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Note: K = Kellogg’s, GM = General Mills, P = Post, Q = Quaker and N = Nabisco.